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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SON T. NGUYEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No- 930156-CA 
Priority No, 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of receiving stolen 
property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1993) and 76-6-412 (1) (b) (i) (1990), in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was there reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
to justify an investigative stop of the vehicle driven by 
defendant? 
The Utah Supreme Court recently attempted to clarify 
the ongoing confusion that has existed over what standard of 
review is applicable to a trial court's determination of 
reasonable suspicion: 
11
 [A] trial court ['s] determination of whether 
a specific set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a determination of 
law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness, as opposed to being a fact 
determination reviewable for clear error. 
[However,] the reasonable-suspicion legal 
standard is one that conveys a measure of 
discretion to the trial judge when applying 
that standard to a given set of facts. 
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, 
but we would not anticipate a close, de novo 
review. On the other hand, a sufficiently 
careful review is necessary to assure that 
the purposes of the reasonable-suspicion 
requirement are served." 
State v. Pena. No. 930101, slip op. at 9-10 (Utah February 15, 
1994) (footnotes omitted). 
2. Was there probable cause to support a warrantless 
search of the vehicle driven by defendant under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement? 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial 
court's determination of whether probable cause existed is 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, State v. Rocha. 
600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979) (applying clearly erroneous 
standard in reviewing trial court's determination that officer 
had probable cause to arrest defendant), its discussion of 
reasonable suspicion in Pena suggests that it will adopt a 
similar stance for probable cause determinations.1 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress statements he made to police and admit 
evidence of defendant's confession? Evidentiary rulings are 
1
 The issue of whether the Rocha clear error standard is 
applicable to warrantless searches is now before the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Pool & Wood, No. 920524. 
2 
reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard; however, 
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations will be given 
deference and reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Any other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent 
to the resolution of the issues on appeal will be set forth in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an information with one count 
of receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1993) and 76-6-412 (1) (a) (i) (1990) 
(R. 1). Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during a 
search of the vehicle he was driving, which was denied by the 
trial court (R. 107-14). (Copies of the trial court's order of 
denial is attached hereto as Addendum A. A copy of its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum 
B.). Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of the 
lesser included offense of receiving stolen property, a third 
degree felony, based on the trial court's determination that 
3 
defendant was in possession of property valued at more than $250 
but not more than $1,000 (R. 113). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison, but suspended execution of the sentence and placed 
defendant on probation (R. 120-21). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On October 27, 1992, Maxine Barker, the owner and 
manager of the "Skyview Cafe" in Spanish Fork Canyon, saw a cream 
colored Toyota or Datsun automobile pull into the parking lot of 
the cafe. There were at least four Asian individuals in the car. 
One of them came into the restaurant and offered to "sell" her 
some quarters (R. 139 at 28). When Barker asked him how many 
quarters he had, the individual indicated that he "[t]wo or three 
hundred rolls," which Barker understood to mean 200 to 300, 
$10.00 rolls of quarters (R. 139 at 25-29). 
Barker told the individual that she could not take that 
many, but agreed to buy two rolls, or $20 in quarters. When the 
man returned to the car to get the quarters, Barker handed an 
order pad to her cook and instructed her to go out the side door 
write down the license plate number of the car (R. 139 at 29). 
The individual returned with two rolls of quarters. 
However, the quarters were not rolled in the customary coin 
2
 "The facts recited below [a]re taken from the transcript 
of the hearing on the motion to suppress, and are recited in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings." State v. 
Delanev, 231 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 20 (Utah App. 1994) (citation 
omitted). A copy of the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
4 
sleeves used by banks and businesses. Instead, they were rolled 
in yellow notebook paper. The individual asked Barker if she 
wanted to count them, but Barker unrolled them only partially and 
said, "No. That's okay" (R. 139 at 30-1). According to Barker, 
she did not want to detain the individual long because he was 
nervous. As the car left the cafe, Barker looked at the license 
plate number and confirmed that it was the same as the number 
recorded by her cook. Because she thought the conduct she had 
observed was suspicious, Barker called the Utah County Dispatch 
and provided the above information to the police (R. 139 at se-
al. 
Shannon Horn, a dispatcher for the Utah County 
Sheriff's office, broadcast an "ATL" (an Attempt to Locate) over 
the radio channel used by the local law enforcement. Her report 
conveyed the information then known to dispatch to officers on 
duty. One the officers who heard the ATL, Utah County Deputy 
Sheriff David Hill, asked Horn to call the other businesses in 
Spanish Fork Canyon to see if they had similar encounters with 
the suspects. Hill also asked Horn to contact Carbon County 
officials to see if there had been any recent burglaries or 
thefts involving vending machines or reports of individuals 
trying to exchange similarly packaged quarters in that area (R. 
139 at 36-7, 71). 
A Carbon County dispatcher told Horn that they had had 
some burglaries of vending machines where quarters had been 
5 
taken.3 Horn also testified that the proprietors of three other 
businesses in the canyon, "The Summit," "Cedar Haven," and "The 
Little Acorn," reported that the suspects had attempted to 
exchange quarters wrapped in yellow paper for currency. The 
proprietors also indicated that they thought this was suspicious. 
Horn ran a check on the license plate, which indicated that it 
was registered to an individual with a Vietnamese name. A 
subsequent check of the registered owner's name revealed that his 
driver's license was under suspension (R. 139 at 37-8, 70-1). 
Horn updated the ATL to include this additional 
information as it became available and relayed it to the highway 
patrol. Horn was on duty at the time the vehicle driven by 
defendant was stopped, and she testified that it was not stopped 
3
 The theft in Price involved several Asian males who 
entered a 7-11 late at night on October 10, 1992 and began 
playing video games. The group left the store at approximately 2 
a.m. on October 11. When the 7-11 clerk was cleaning the store 
at approximately 7 a.m., she noticed that the lights on one of 
the machines were not on. She conducted a cursory examination of 
the machine, but did not see anything that looked awry (R. 13 9 at 
7-12) . 
Two days later, the store manager contacted the vender 
who owned the machine to report that it was not working. The 
vender instructed the manager to check the coin box to see if the 
control panel above it was intact. When the manager did so, she 
learned that the lock on the box had been cut and the coin box 
and control board removed. The theft had gone undetected because 
the lock was put back in place to conceal the fact that the 
machine had been tampered with (R. 139 at 12-19). 
The manager contacted the Price City Police. An 
officer investigated the theft and filed a report that same day 
(R. 19-24) . 
Although the Carbon County dispatcher told Horn that 
Price officials wanted to talk with the individuals in the 
suspect vehicle about a recent burglary involving theft of 
quarters from a vending machine, it appears she did not provide 
Horn the date of the theft or other details of the crime (R. 13 9 
at 37, 40). 
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until all of the information she had received was broadcast to 
law enforcement personal (R. 139 at 36-9) . 
Penny Turner, a Utah Department of Public Safety 
Dispatcher, similarly testified that she received an ATL from 
Utah County Sheriff's Office and broadcasted the information it 
contained to highway patrol officers. According to Turner, all 
of the information she received from Utah County dispatch --
including the information about the vending machine burglary in 
Price -- was relayed to highway patrol officers before the 
suspect vehicle was stopped (R. 139 at 42-50). 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Dennis Shields was 
patrolling the north end of Utah County on October 27, 1992. 
Like other officers in the area, he heard the ATL. Shortly after 
hearing an updated ATL, Shields was told by dispatch that the 
suspect vehicle had been located by a department of 
transportation worker traveling northbound in American Fork. 
Shields overtook the department of transportation vehicle and 
began following the car driven by defendant. The car was tan in 
color, there were five oriental males in the car and its license 
plate matched that provided by dispatch. Shields informed 
dispatch that he was going to stop the vehicle and was advised 
that officers from the American Fork Police Department and Utah 
County Sheriff's Office were en route to his location, as were 
other highway patrol troopers (R. 139 at 55-61). 
As Shields was stopping the suspect vehicle, dispatch 
reported that Price City Police wanted to talk to the vehicle 
7 
occupants about a vending machine burglary in their area (R. 13 9 
at 58, 63). Before Shields got out of his car, another officer 
arrived at the scene. As Shields approached the driver's side of 
the car, the other officer approached the car on the passenger's 
side (R. 139 at 59) . 
Defendant was driving the car, and Shields told 
defendant that he stopped him because of reports that defendant 
had attempted to exchange several hundred dollars worth of 
quarters at local businesses. Shields then asked defendant if he 
had "any large amounts of quarters wrapped up in yellow paper [,]" 
and defendant responded, "[n]o" (R. 139 at 60). When asked if he 
had been in Price, defendant told Shields that they were coming 
back from Denver, but he denied being in the Price area. The 
officers then decided to have defendant and his four passengers 
get out of the car. Shields requested and received defendant's 
driver's license. He also asked defendant who was the registered 
owner of the vehicle, and defendant told him it was "a friend's" 
(R. 13 9 at 61). When asked by Shields if he would tell the 
officer the name of the registered owner, defendant was unable to 
do so. Instead, defendant again told Shield only that the 
vehicle was registered to "a friend" (R. 139 at 60-2). 
At that point, Deputy Hill arrived at the scene and 
asked the other officers who was driving the vehicle when it was 
stopped. When he was told that defendant was the driver, Hill 
escorted defendant back to Hill's truck. There, Hill again 
explained to defendant why he had been stopped (R. 13 9 at 62, 73-
8 
4). Hill also apprised defendant of his rights under Miranda, 
and defendant agreed to talk with Hill without an having an 
attorney present (R. 139 at 104-05). 
Hill asked defendant if he had any coins in the car, 
and defendant said he had none. Hill reiterated, l![t]here are no 
coins in the car at all?" Defendant again said, fI[n]o" (R. 139 
at 105). When asked where they were coming from, defendant told 
Hill that he and his passengers had been visiting a friend in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Defendant again said that the car 
belonged to a friend and, for the first time, indicated that his 
friend's name was "Bo" (R. 139 at 105). 
Hill knew, however, that the name of the registered 
owner was "completely different," and so he asked defendant for 
"Bo's phone number" (R. 139 at 105-06). Defendant indicated he 
didn't know his friend's phone number. That, coupled with 
defendant's failure to provide the correct name of the vehicle's 
registered owner, prompted Hill to suspect that the vehicle may 
have been stolen (R. 139 at 106). 
In the meantime, Shields and some of the other officers 
started to search the vehicle. They opened the trunk and found a 
duffel bag containing a large quantity of loose quarters as well 
as quarters that were rolled in yellow paper like that described 
by Barker and the other proprietors. There was also a pair of 
vice grips sitting on top of the bag. Just as Hill finished 
questioning defendant, one of the other officers took the duffel 
bag back to the Hill's truck to show him what they had found (R. 
9 
13 9 at 106). Instead of continuing their investigation on the 
side of the highway, the officers decided to take defendant and 
the other suspects into custody and continue their investigation 
at the American Fork Police Station (R. 139 at 112-13, 115). A 
search of the vehicle uncovered legal pads with yellow paper, 
additional rolls of quarters stowed in white socks, and a pillow 
case containing bolt cutters4 and screwdrivers (R. 13 9 at 107-
09, 113-15). The quarters were taken to a nearby bank to be 
counted. The total value of the quarters was $2,096.75 (R. 13 9 
at 111). 
At the American Fork Police Station, Deputy Scott 
Carter of the Utah County Sheriff's office met with defendant for 
the first time. Carter was told by other officers that defendant 
had been apprised of his rights under Miranda, and he confirmed 
that defendant was aware of those rights and asked defendant if 
he was willing to answer questions. Defendant indicated his 
willingness to do so, and Carter taped the ensuing interrogation 
(R. 139 at 122-24). 
Defendant admitted that he and his friends had taken 
the quarters from some video machines at 7-11 stores located in 
Colorado. Defendant explained that he and four juveniles 
typically entered the targeted 7-11 and played the video games 
4
 The bolt cutters and the lock that was on the video 
machine at the 7-11 in Price were analyzed by the state crime 
lab. It was stipulated that the investigators at the lab would 
have testified that the lock was not cut by those bolt cutters 
(R. 139 at 52). However, because defendant was charged only with 
receiving stolen property and not charged with burglary, that 
finding is of little import. 
10 
until the store clerk felt comfortable with them. Eventually, 
the five would break into the machine, steal the coin box, and 
depart (R. 13 9 at 126). Defendant indicated that they had done 
this at two 7-11 stores in the Colorado Springs area and at two 
other stores, the locations of which were unclear. Although 
defendant admitted that the quarters found in the vehicle were 
the spoils of those burglaries, he was unable to discern how much 
money was taken from each establishment (R. 139 at 125-27). 
Carter interrogated defendant again at the county jail 
two days later. Defendant was verbally apprised of his Miranda 
rights, and Carter provided defendant a voluntary statement form 
that included a written statement of those rights. On that form, 
defendant executed a signed, handwritten statement indicating 
that the quarters were stolen in burglaries of four 7-11 stores 
located in Colorado (R. 138, exhibit #11). During the course of 
that interrogation, defendant provided a more detailed 
explanation of how he and his cohorts broke into the video 
machines using the bolt cutters, screwdrivers and vice grips 
found in the vehicle. He contended, however, that he was 
primarily a lookout and driver. Defendant also denied 
burglarizing the video machine at the 7-11 store located in Price 
(R. 139 at 129-34). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress. The stop of the vehicle driven by defendant was 
supported by reasonable suspicion of theft of quarters from 
11 
vending machines, and the scope of the ensuing detention was 
strictly tied to investigation into that suspicion. Upon 
stopping the vehicle, the investigating officer's obtained 
sufficient information to establish the probable cause necessary 
to justify searching the vehicle under the automobile exception 
rule. Finally, there was other competent evidence aside from 
defendant's confession to police that justified admission of that 
confession under the corpus delicti rule. Accordingly, this 
Court should uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress, and affirm defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROPER BECAUSE IT WAS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY. 
The trial court properly determined that the "initial 
stop of the vehicle being driven by the Defendant was lawful 
[because it was] based upon reasonable suspicion that the 
Defendant or the occupants of the car were involved in video 
[machine] burglaries in the Price area or that the occupants of 
the car [had] evidence which [sic] may have been relevant to the 
Price investigation" (R. 108). As demonstrated below, the facts 
known to Trooper Shields at the time he made the stop easily 
satisfy the minimal objective justification standard for 
establishing reasonable suspicion. This Court should therefore 
uphold the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion. 
12 
A. The Standard for Proving Reasonable Suspicion 
is Considerably Less Than a Preponderance of 
the Evidence* 
The reasonable suspicion test for making an 
investigative stop is well-known: "where an officer observes 
unusual conduct which reasonably leads him to conclude in light 
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot" a brief 
investigative stop and detention to dispel the officer's 
suspicion or prevent criminal activity is justified. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 30 (1968) (emphasis added). As the term 
"may" implies, an officer's on-the-spot determination of whether 
there is reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop 
requires a weighing of probabilities: 
"The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people 
formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 
are permitted to do the same -- and so are 
law enforcement officers." 
United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 
(1989) (quoting United State v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 
(1981)). 
That is not to say that officers have unbridled 
discretion to stop and detain citizens without being able to 
articulate some basis for doing so: 
The officer, of course, must be able to 
articulate something more than an inchoate 
and unparticularlized suspicion or hunch. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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It is clear, however, that the standard for 
establishing reasonable suspicion is a low threshold of proof: 
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal 
objective justification" for making the stop. 
That level of suspicion is considerably less 
than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance 
of the evidence. We have held that probable 
cause means "a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found," and the level of suspicion required 
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding 
than probable cause . . . . 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and some 
internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Accord 
Terrv, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. 
Shortly after Sokolow was decided, the Utah Supreme 
Court similarly recognized that the standard of proof needed to 
establish reasonable suspicion was less than that needed for 
probable cause. In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), the 
defendant, suspected of robbery, was stopped and questioned by an 
officer. Significantly, the defendant argued that his initial 
detention was unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 650. The 
Supreme Court, however, relying upon Terry and its own post-Terry 
case law, upheld the stop on the less strict, reasonable 
suspicion standard: "We have held that a brief investigatory 
stop of an individual by police officers is permissible when the 
officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, 
that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Bruce, 
779 P.2d at 650 (quoting authorities; internal quotations 
omitted). 
In the wake of Sokolow and Bruce, this Court also 
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recognized that reasonable suspicion requires only a minimal 
level of certainty by stating, in State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
541 (Utah App. 1990), that reasonable suspicion "must be based on 
objective facts suggesting that the individual mav be involved in 
criminal activity" (emphasis added) . Bruce and Menlce comport 
with the fourth amendment's "minimal objective justification" 
standard for establishing reasonable suspicion, set fourth in 
Sokolow. 
The Sokolow standard for establishing reasonable 
suspicion recognizes that limited, non-arrest detentions serve 
not merely to apprehend criminals, but also to disp^]_ suspicion 
and prevent, criminal activity. E.g. . Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 
S. Ct. at 1880 (limited detentions supported by interest in 
"effective crime prevention and detection"). That definition 
contemplates the very real likelihood that many such detentions 
will reveal no criminal evidence. That likelihood, however, does 
not erode the validity of acting upon facts that, at the moment 
in question, would warrant a person of "reasonable Caution" in 
taking action. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. 
In evaluating the validity of an investigative stop or 
detention, a court must consider "'the totality of the 
circumstances -- the whole picture.'" Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 8, 
109 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting United State v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 
417 (1981)). See also State v. Stricklincr. 844 P.2d 979, 983 
(Utah App. 1992). Accordingly, "dissecting the facts that 
confronted [the officer]" and [l]ooking at each fact in isolation 
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. . . is not proper." Stricklincr. 844 P.2d at 983. 
There may also have been wholly innocent explanations 
and alternative inferences to be drawn from every one of the 
factors confronting the officer. That, however, has never been a 
proper basis for ruling that an investigative detention was 
invalid: 
We said in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 
S. Ct. 2752, [] (1980) (per curiam), "there 
could, of course, be circumstances in which 
wholly lawful conduct might justify the 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." 
. . . Indeed, Terry IV. Ohio] itself involved 
"a series of acts, each of them perhaps 
innocent" if viewed separately, "but which 
taken together warranted further 
investigation." 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S. Ct., 
at 1881. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87. 
Utah courts also have recognized that potentially 
innocent behavior may nonetheless give rise to reasonable 
suspicion. In State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App. 
1992), the defendant argued that 'all of the factors justifying 
reasonable suspicion listed by the [officer] [we]re consistent 
with innocent behavior and thus, [could not] amount to reasonable 
suspicion." This Court rejected that argument and held that 
ft[t]he trial court's findings of fact show that a reasonable 
person would conclude that Chapman had violated the [law]." Id. 
at 728 (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, in Menke, this Court correctly held that the 
behavior of an individual outside a shopping mall, "although 
conceivably consistent with innocent--albeit highly eccentric--
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activity," were nevertheless also consistent with shoplifting. 
787 P.2d at 541. Therefore, the detention of that individual by 
the observing officers was deemed reasonable. Id. This Court 
recently reiterated its adherence to Menke in Provo Citv v. 
Spotts, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Spotts, as in Chapman, the defendant argued that 
"prior to the stop, [the officer] observed no activity 
inconsistent with innocent behavior" and that the officer 
therefore lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. 
at 32. The Spotts court easily rejected that claim and reviewed 
all of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the 
stop before concluding that "although defendant's activity was 
conceivably consistent with innocent behavior, it was strongly 
indicative of criminal activity[.]" Id. at 33. The court 
therefore upheld the trial court's finding of reasonable 
suspicion. Id. 
In this case, while it is true that there may have been 
some innocent explanation for defendant's unusual activity, his 
conduct was nevertheless suspicious. The facts that support the 
trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion are discussed below 
in subsection B. 
B# Law Enforcement Personnel had Sufficient 
Facts to Justify Making An Investigative Stop 
of Defendant's Vehicle, 
Shields stopped defendant's vehicle based on the 
Attempt to Locate Order ("ATL") issued by police dispatch. Under 
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State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989): 
[I]f a flyer or bulletin has been issued on 
the basis of articulable facts supporting a 
reasonable suspicion that the wanted person 
has committed an offense, then reliance on 
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to 
check identification, to pose questions to 
the person, or to detain the person briefly 
while attempting to obtain further 
information. If the flyer [or bulletin] has 
been issued in the absence of a reasonable 
suspicion, then a stop in the objective 
reliance upon it violates the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d at 650 (quoting United States v. Henslev, 469 
U.S. 221, 232-33, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682 (1985)). See also State v. 
Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Bruce for 
proposition that a police dispatch supported by reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity may be relied upon by police 
officers in stopping a vehicle and making further investigation). 
Accordingly, the precise issue to be addressed is whether the ATL 
issued by police dispatch was supported by a "minimal objective 
justification" giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. Roth, 827 P.2d at 257. It clearly was. 
By the time the vehicle driven by defendant was 
stopped, the ATL was supported by several pieces of information 
that, considered collectively, easily satisfy the minimal 
objective justification standard for establishing reasonable 
suspicion. First, dispatch had been told the vehicle was either 
light tan, cream or white in color and that it was a foreign car 
-- either a Toyota or a Datsun. The vehicle driven by defendant 
was a tan Toyota. Second, dispatch had an accurate license plate 
18 
number as provided by Barker that matched the license plate 
number on defendant's vehicle. Third, dispatch knew the race and 
gender of the vehicle's four or five occupants. Fourth, dispatch 
knew not only the vehicle's location, but also its path through 
the canyon based on its stops at various businesses and the 
observation of the UDOT worker who reported that the car was 
traveling northbound near American Fork. These factors all 
support the identification of the vehicle driven by defendant as 
the "suspect vehicle." Cf. Roth, 827 P.2d at 257 (noting that 
the dispatcher in that case provided the make, color, location 
and license plate of the stopped vehicle as well as a "gender 
description" of the "drunk driver"). 
On the issue of whether the conduct of defendant and 
his cohorts was sufficiently suspicious to warrant investigation, 
the most compelling information was that provided by ordinary 
citizens.5 For instance, Barker reported that defendant entered 
her cafe and attempted to exchange "two to three hundred" rolls 
of quarters. Defendant's youth, nervous behavior and possession 
of $2,000 to $3,000 was so suspicious to Barker that she directed 
5
 Information obtained from ordinary citizens is generally 
presumed to be reliable. See, e.g.. State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 
515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) ("[R]eliability and veracity are 
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives 
nothing from police in exchange for the information.") (citations 
omitted). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 
3.4(a) at 712-23 (1987). Unlike a police informant who is from 
the criminal milieu, ordinary citizens typically have no interest 
in reporting suspected criminal activity beyond the desire "to 
aid the police in law enforcement because of [their] concern for 
society or for [their] own safety. [They do] not expect any gain 
or concession in exchange for [their] information." Id. at 716. 
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her cook to record the license plate number of the car driven by 
defendant. When defendant returned to the cafe and gave Barker 
two rolls of quarters wrapped in yellow notebook paper instead of 
standard coin sleeves, Barker's suspicion was further heightened. 
Barker was not the only citizen to report such 
suspicions to the police. Personnel at three other businesses 
reported similar encounters to police within a very short period 
of time. Like Barker, the other proprietors considered the use 
of yellow notebook paper to roll the large quantity of quarters 
offered to them by defendant suspicious. 
In sum, ordinary citizens at four businesses acting 
independently of each other reported their concerns about their 
encounters with defendant and his cohorts. While attempts by 
four to five youths to exchange thousands of dollars worth of 
quarters for currency may well be commonplace in such slot 
machine hotbeds as Las Vegas or Atlantic City, the citizens of 
Spanish Fork Canyon clearly thought such conduct was suspicious 
for their neck-of-the-woods. Dispatch knew, however, the each 
encounter was not merely an isolated incident. Rather, it was 
clear that defendant and his colleagues were attempting to 
exchange quarters wrapped in yellow paper at each business 
establishment as they traveled through the canyon. 
Defendant's response to this evidence is simply that it 
is neither illegal to accumulate quarters nor improper to roll 
them in yellow notebook paper instead of coin sleeves. While 
true, defendant's assertion is irrelevant. Spotts, 223 Utah Adv. 
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Rep. ,; -. unapmai
 f MenAt 
(all rejecting claim that reasonable suspicion could not arise 
from facts that were subject -^ innocent explanations). 
M o r e o v e r^ defendant "' .^ -Jo"" 
"innocent explanations" is precisely the sort of "dissecting [* :. 
the facts"' that :i s condemned under the totality of the 
circumstances test. Stricklmu -3. 
The critical inquiry is simply whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, an officer would be justified in 
stopping the suspe.. 
they got the quarters and * **•. :. e :•:-. trying to exchange them 
bv .-: — --: — businesses "door * r- i^r1' instead of going f'ri a hank, 
Certainly hen supplemented •. - repor ",«'l receni I. HI I yla i U-'K 
in Price involving the theft of a large juantity of quarters from 
v--1 :•}-.- law enforcement personnel could reasonably 
suspect Lutti criminal activity may be afoot an ; 
investigative detention was therefore justified. 
Oth* -bvt- similarly recognized that attempts to 
exchange coins for currency may, depending upon the 
circumstances, give rise to reasonable suspicion to support an 
i nvesMqat/p »e nt p and even probable cause to arrest, S ee. e r 
State v. Sell, 4 96 * *., , eopie v. Evans. J2 
Ill.App.3d 865, 336 N.E.2d 792 (1975); People v. Beard. 35 
] , -:a J4J, (1976); State v . Maxie, 377 P. 2d 
435 (Wash. 1962).6 
In Sell, a police officer was told by the owner of a 
local camera store that "three 'unkempt boys' who were strangers 
in the town had just been in his store trying to sell some 
coins." Sell, 496 P.2d at 45. The officer soon observed the 
three boys walking down the street in the area of the camera 
store. They were the only three boys the officer had seen 
together that were strangers. After picking up another officer, 
he circled around the block and saw the three boys get into a 
car. The officers followed the car and clocked it traveling at 
30 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone. At that juncture, the officers 
stopped the trio "for speeding . . . [and because] three youths 
trying to sell some coins in the City of Winnemucca" was 
suspicious. Id. 
Based on the facts presented, the Sell court held that 
there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and that it 
was 
[im]material whether the defendant's car was 
initially stopped by police because of the 
speeding violation or simply for purposes of 
momentary on-the-street detention to 
determine the identity of the defendant and 
his passengers. In either case, the police 
acted justifiably. 
Id. at 50. 
In this case, the totality of the circumstances known 
6
 Because Evans, Beard and Maxie involve findings of 
probable cause, they are discussed under Point II of this brief, 
which addresses the question of whether the search of defendant's 
vehicle was supported by probable cause. 
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ti". |.."ilice before defendant was stopped ~^e * ir mere compel] ir.c: 
than those known ^ n,c oii.ceit -a Sell. .._--., ;,. ^  . _ /^t 
just one reported attempt t.: sell coins; they had four such 
r*poi ts, Whereas Sell does : - specify the amount ~f -"---^  
involved, here it is cle ,. ..* defendant had between 
$3,000 in quarters, some of which were
 L ed in yellow notebook 
paper i nsteacll MI - *-?rH--^ *;I •.!.. «x e e v e s inallv Ain ?el 1 the 
officer did not know - ; any reports involving : :,•_ i..e:: \--:, 
but the officers a:, t: .s case knew that Price City Police were 
jnves! iqat MIM I Iif • vendina machines involving 
the theft of a large quantity wx. quarters. 
The totality "f * -e circumstances known v^ . av; 
enf 01 ~ •» - * * ' - ' - ~ \: -" J f: r a t: • n" 
standard needed LL. establish reasonable suspicion ; _•= ;: . dl 
court s finding that the investigative stop of defendant's car 
\ i * • 1 . 
The Investigative Detention Lasted No Longer 
Than Was Reasonably Necessary and Its Scope 
• Was Strictly Tied to the Circumstances That 
Justified the Initial Stop. 
After stopping defendant .- vehicle, Shields acted to 
(iifcp - :' - r Pu,P] i inIIP" i e s s 
challenges the scope ct detention by relying on cases that 
articulate the parameters of routine traffic stops. He then 
digtieb Hi I ' ""I "Il i " t: s i ;: a s n :: th il i lg MI ml li ' i IM |, rpq n P* ' *' i r 
the inside ot the c>: . .tat justified the detention. Br. .->: 
Appellant at 70-2-1 defendant's analysis of the scope issue _s 
fundament a] 1 y I I r 
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The stop in this case was not for a routine traffic 
violation. Rather, it was based on an ATL for investigation of 
theft, and the scope of detention issue is therefore controlled 
by Bruce, 779 P.2d at 650. Here, the officers checked 
defendant's identification and detained him only "briefly while 
attempting to gather additional information" about the quarters 
defendant was trying to -exchange for currency at local 
businesses. That is precisely what the officers should have done 
under Bruce. Because defendant provided false and unsatisfactory 
answers to police questions, his continued detention was 
justified. Indeed, as demonstrated in Point II below, the 
additional information obtained by the officers after defendant 
was stopped elevated the level of suspicion beyond reasonable 
suspicion to probable cause. 
POINT II 
THE FACTS KNOWN TO THE INVESTIGATING OFFICERS 
JUSTIFIED A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE 
UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT 
The trial court's determination that the warrantless 
search of the vehicle driven by defendant was proper under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement first articulated 
in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1925), should 
be upheld. 
The Carroll Court determined that a warrantless search 
of an automobile was permissible if the searching officers "have 
probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either 
contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if 
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not immediately seized," State v. Dronebura. ~~l I la i - : < , 1305 
<r-r -A' • i ,^Lw -. C::^  a. s tenser; 
(Utah 1984 See Chambers v. Maronev, 399 n .-,,., 
California v. Carnev. 471 V 'Sf (1985); State v. Dorsey, 731 
I Sec ^
 dL, state —>kc^j 
P.2d 460, 469~, (Utah 1990) (retaining the traditional 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement under article I# 
s e (J i i "" >l i i • 11 i 11 ( i ' i J 11 i 1111' i • i i • i 11111 'I ' 1111 11111 in i i 111 I i i 
vehicle is lawfully stopped based upon reasonable suspicior 
criminal arriv.n- and t-he officers have probable cause s 
fael^ - >:: 
of a crime tfcc* -~ey be lost if net immediately seized, the 
Carroll doctrine justifies ~-~ immediate and warrantless search. 
State v. Leonard, W-J,LJ t-" ua^c v . 
Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978); Christensen, 676 P.2d •" 
4 ii , _ :-IQ S t a t e ^ V ?-* "CA • ' ** -.^  ^ - . 
In this case, defendant cnanenges oni^ 
court's finding of probable cause; he does not attack the trial 
< • ^ * • L "exigent circumstances" justified an 
immediate and warrantless searc .. .. e 
State's analysis of the vehicle search .v therefore confined * 
7
 Defendant does not, however, advance a distinct claim 
under the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, this Court should 
limit its analysis to that called for under the fourth amendment. 
See, State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 n.l (Utah 1987); State v. 
'Belaard, 840 P.2d 819, 821 n.l (Utah Ct, App. 1993) (both holding 
that where a defendant relies on the fourth amendment and 
advances no claim under the state constitution, appellate court 
will not engage j n a separate state constitutional analysis). 
the issue of probable cause. 
A. The Investigating Officers Had 
Probable Cause to Believe the 
Vehicle contained Quarters that 
Were Stolen From Vending Machines, 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have defined probable cause for a vehicle search as "a 
belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances known to the 
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains 
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction." 
Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1087-88 (citations omitted). This probable 
cause assessment is made "from the objective standpoint of a 
'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer . . . guided by his 
experience and training.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 
458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
Although the test for establishing probable cause may 
at first blush appear exacting, it in fact requires a common 
sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances confronting 
the officer at the time of the search: 
In dealing with probable cause, however, as 
the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities. These are not technical; they 
are the factual and practical considerations 
of every day life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The 
standard of proof is accordingly correlative 
to what must be proved. 
Dorsev. 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Brineaar. 388 U.S. at 175, 69 
S.Ct. at 1310.). Because probable cause does not require 
certainty, ,f[t]he line between 'mere suspicion and probable cause 
. . . necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in 
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the light of the particular situation and with account taken of 
a l l I In MM-:.: rHirt-'«" » lu] < • 111 > • I i m j I ' l i m , U c t r , I M I Ti r i ,ii il i 
6 9 S . C t . >]| 1 .3111 
Courts must also be mindful of the degree zi proof 
r- * 
the level of probable cause. Probable cause means u air 
probability that contraband or evidence of .-.• crime u:"_.. be 
f'OUJJUll I , I . . . . F 
criminal activity, I.^T an a-. ^ ad± showing of such activity . 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 I • . - 243-4- : < :-— . 
A c c t 11 1 1 J IK| 1 v , i i I 'i 11 I in I I in i i 
Supreme Court have emphasized, "probable cause does not require 
more than a rationally based conclusion of probability•[.]" 
Dorse\ dimcuai v , United states, 338 
U.S. 160, wS - - (194 9) This Court has 
similarly indicated that probable cause requires "'only the 
probaj:--
activity Morck, 821 i .. : :.r . * (quoting State v. Brown, 798 
P. 2d *o<± -
suspicion" that the vehicle driven by defendant contained 
evidence of a crime. As flip trial court implicit •• recognized in 
denying defendant u mini n in in Aiypi esb, Llii1 i . 
the officers at the time of the search would have prompted a 
"prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer" 1 conclude that 
there was a "substantial chance vehicle contained evidence 
relevant to a burglary or theft of coins. That ruling should be 
upheld. 
As indicated in Point I, other courts addressing 
circumstances similar to those presented in this case have held 
that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant or 
search the area in question.8 
In Beard, for instance, police dispatch issued a 
bulletin indicating that two black men in a "black-over-red 
Cadillac with a given license number" had "attempted to exchange 
some silver coins for currency at a liquor store [.]" Beard. 342 
N.E.2d at 344. The report was later updated after it was learned 
that the two had stopped at another location and again tried to 
exchange silver coins for currency. In the meantime, another 
officer learned that a ,f considerable quantity of silver coins had 
been taken in [aj burglary." Beard, 342 N.E.2d at 344. Having 
8
 As Professor LaFave explains in his treatise on search and 
seizure, ,f[i]t is generally assumed by the Supreme Court and 
lower courts that the same quantum of evidence is required 
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or 
probable cause to search. For this reason, discussions by courts 
of the probable cause requirement often refer to and rely upon 
prior decisions without regard to whether these earlier cases 
were concerned with the grounds to arrest or the grounds to 
search." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.1(b), at 544 
(1987) (footnote omitted). LaFave summarizes the difference 
between what must be shown in each context: "In the case of 
arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee, 
whereas in the case of search[es,] the conclusions go to the 
connection of the items sought with crime and to their present 
location." Id. at 545 (citation omitted). 
With this distinction in mind, the State will rely on 
cases involving probably cause to arrest insofar as they help to 
demonstrate that there was a "substantial chance" that the 
quarters reportedly in defendant's possession were connected with 
criminal activity. 
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heard "h-- e-rl.^r bulletin, th<=> officer told police headquarters 
that ;..*• . - -. 
officer in an unmarked car spotted the Cadillac ai coin shop and 
requested backup assistance, As soon as the Cadillac left the 
store, the o 111"...," *"j i t. • I 1 •, • w 111«) i I 
marked police car fell i n behind the Cadillac and stoppeu it. 
The Beard court upheld the stop r^f r.^<* vehicle - r * "6 ground that 
"there was ce::. :.. ., ., • .u 1 .e 
defendants! • Id^, at 34 8.9 
In . similar case, the Washington Supreme Court upheld 
the arrest of h^e aerenaan. •_ i l* 
A police officer in a small town learned, at 
1:45 a.m., that a cafe in the community had 
just been broken into and that the loot 
included a quantity of Canadian coins; and, 
then, a short time later when he learned from 
a waitress in an all-night cafe that a 
stranger, whom she pointed out, had just 
requested her to give him dollar bills for 
coins (mostly Canadian), which she had done, 
he questioned the stranger and, believing 
that he had committed the burglary, arrested 
him. 
State v. Maxie. ^nn <- - - "' - n:-lumen, 
the c.jurt opined that "had the officer failed * . .<e ar. arrest 
V-"-- • '••••-* imstances, he would have been derelict in his 
duty." IsL. at 438. 
Although the coins involved in both Maxie and Beard 
5
 __ should be noted that, although the Beard court cited 
Terry in its opinion, it did not characterize the stop of Beard 
and his codefendant as an investigative Terry stop requiring only 
reasonable suspicion. Instead, the court deemed the stop an 
"arrest" requiring a showing of probable cause. Beard, **49 
N.E.2d at 346-47. 
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were arguably more distinctive than those involved in this case, 
the important similarity between the three cases is that the 
investigating officers knew that the coins in question were the 
same type as those that had recently been stolen in nearby 
burglaries. (In contrast, had defendant attempted to exchange a 
large quantity of dimes, then the fact that there had been a 
recent theft involving quarters would obviously be less 
significant.) 
Yet another case, Evans, 336 N.E.2d 792, illustrates 
how a general report of criminal activity in a particular area 
can be combined with recently observed suspicious activity 
reported by an ordinary citizen to establish probable cause. 
About a week after she had read newspaper accounts warning that 
people had been "selling fraudulent rolls of coins, with a 
quarter at each end and washers in between, to grocery stores in 
the area," a woman leaving a grocery store saw two men in the car 
parked next to her car. Evans, 336 N.E.2d at 793. As she opened 
her door, the woman watched to make sure that it did not hit the 
other car. In so doing, she noticed the man in the passenger 
seat doing something with his hands and saw "quite a few 
different colored coin wrappers inside the open glove 
compartment. The passenger looked up at her and quickly closed 
the glove compartment." Id. Suspicious, the woman wrote down 
the license plate number and later called police to report what 
she had seen. Id. 
Police dispatch issued a bulletin on the suspects about 
30 
an hour after receiving the citizen report: Shortly thereafter, 
c ' * ne 
then ran .4 t^ the cai and asked trie driver, Evans, 1^1 n-^ 
driven - license Aft*.-* the officer made the stop, other police 
c . . - n- < • t ci 
search the glove compartment follow them the po.^wc 
station, the supervising" officer ordered that :*r defendant and 
t . 
to th*r static: The Evans court held that trie officer "had 
reasonable grounds * r~ believe the defendants were involved in the 
c - • . 
In t;..s cas- the officers had a report involving the 
recent theft ^* quarters from vending machines :r a neighboring 
county , . • . -- - /.uluc'L <JS 
reported by ordinary citizens, that :--; :,f takes *..*:. added 
significance. Moreover J>- <•**: a.° vi- >* n Evans considered 
the uncooperati^ .. .-. 
important for purposes of establishing probable cause, the fact 
that defendant provided obviously false and evasive answers to 
police inquires helped I11 "i-' r»Ki IBJI luuljdlil! 1 aubt iii l hi 
See Menke, 787 P.2d at 54: Courts and commentators agree that a 
defendant's false c» evasive responses [to police questions] in 
conjunction with hig . suspj t ,IM n 1 sr- lu-h i) I m M | in 
determine the existence of probable cause See generally 
United States v Ortiz, 422 u.^ f— 2585, 2589 
(19751 (a suspect's responses t . quest. 
• ••. ' ' I I 
considered in evaluating whether a subsequent warrantless search 
was supported by probable cause). 
As Professor LaFave explains: 
Just as a satisfactory explanation of 
circumstances previously appearing suspicious 
to the [investigating] officer will likely 
necessitate the conclusion that those 
suspicions do not then amount to probable 
cause, responses by the suspect [that] the 
officer knows -to be false, or which are 
implausible, conflicting, evasive or 
unresponsive may well constitute probable 
cause when considered together with the prior 
suspicions. 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.6(f) at 65-66 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 
One common situation in which unsatisfactory responses 
to police questions may elevate the prior suspicions to the level 
of probable is that in which the questioning is prompted by 
suspicious possession of certain property. Id. As explained 
above, under the unusual circumstances known at the time of the 
initial stop, defendant's possession of quarters appeared highly 
suspicious. Although defendant now postulates about the possible 
"innocent explanations" for his eccentric behavior, at the time 
of the stop, he offered no such explanations for his conduct. 
As this Court recognized in Menke: 
It is not too much to expect that if a 
legitimate reason existed for this suspicious 
behavior, one with innocent purpose would 
hasten to offer it. But when appellant 
elected not to do so, and instead gave the 
[false] response that he did, that fact may 
-- and here we hold did -- tip the scales in 
favor of probable cause to believe that 
appellant had been attempting to [commit the 
crime]. 
32 
Menke, 787 P.2d at 542 (quot ing Arrington v. United States, 311 
A, 2d B JB , Li'Il ! Il i 2 I! £ \ 3) ) 
In this case, defendant was evasive when asked for the 
name of the vehiclr' £* registered owner Taylor v. 
Commonwe a11h, _ 
(fact that both occupants of stopped truck professed to have no 
operators license and no: identification added *- -"inding 
probable cause to search). More imp0rtan >-..; .-iiil: 
hasten to offer an innocent explanation for s suspicious 
conduct He i nstead falsely denied hav-'~.~ Quarters :* >-" s car. 
Shields and the other officers knew : . . ., 
assertion that there were no quarters in the car was untruthful 
because I hey Iin :! reports from four different businesses 
indicating that defendant had attempted to exchange hundreds of 
dollars worth :+ quarters t. .  currency. Defendant's false denial 
s** ' - • * :readv — T J suspicions that 
the vehicle contained evidence „. i w ..rime and elevatec . : .: : he 
level of probable cause. See generally Menke, 787 P.2d at: 543. 
See also State * Busbv , 6 5 6 S \ 1 2 i 8 2 0 , IE!22 ( M < > A\ "ij» "I "' 111 \! ! ,»i 11 
apparent falsehood" helped establish probable cause where 
officers knew that the defendant had been seen with murder victim 
a I I llh I in ill i l l nii'H"' I in i mi i Il ill I In1 defender- 1 aimed t h a t li ••  h a d 
not seen the victim on i ^ .*« . -as murdered); State v. 
Reynolds. 619 S.W.2d ^ : *- ^ 1981) (the defendant's 
i 
whereabouts and activities w.. ine day of LI-- homicide" 
contributed to finding of probable cause); Taylor, 284 S.E.2d at 
836-37 (court rejected the defendant's claim that there was 
"nothing connecting the fact that [his truck] was [heavily] 
loaded to the fact that it was loaded with contraband as opposed 
to furniture or other legal material" in part because "[t]he 
occupants maintained that the vehicle was empty; yet it obviously 
was loaded"). 
Under the totality of the circumstances, reports from 
four different businesses that defendant had attempted to 
exchange hundreds of dollars worth of quarters for currency, the 
fact that the quarters were wrapped in yellow notebook instead of 
commonly used coin sleeves, the report of a recent burglary in 
Price involving the theft of a large quantity of quarters, and 
defendant' s obviously false and evasive responses to police 
questions would prompt a "prudent, reasonable, cautious police 
officer" to conclude that there was a "substantial chance" the 
vehicle contained evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of 
coins. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the 
search was supported by probable cause is amply supported by the 
record. This Court should therefore affirm the court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH CORPUS DELICTI INDEPENDENT OF 
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION. EVIDENCE OF THAT 
CONFESSION WAS THEREFORE PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Evidence of defendant's confession to police was 
properly admitted at trial. It is well settled that "before a 
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defendant's inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence 
aqaiiLsr def eri'Lint llu> 11 1 i 'SPi "lit i«'ii1 mart pi ^ ve the occurrence of 
a crime, _ . <-. corpus delict. otate v. Johnson, i 
1150, 1162 (Utah 1991 . To satisfy the rule, the prosecution 
i i "i1 ' - ' | 1 r\- r •' *-*--, wrong was 
done and (ii) such wrong was the result ^: riminal conduct, ,: 
Id, at 1164, Both direct and circumstantio evidence can be used 
. t. d h l iJ.,|. i I , SpOtt£ * ^ " r " m l ! I ', . 
The evidence presented .;, : .^  ~ase e«B 4 Jv ^L^sfies v corpus 
delicti rule. 
T " l I v , ' . I "mi l l l i i l l | n, n D l i C , C r J ' T f i - 1  I I I i l l i II. | I n":i I " y I " l 
established the recent commission ol burglary - "That, evidence 
alone constitutes clear and convincing evidence of the corpus 
*" i I I II i 1 1 I I I in I I i i II, I ! mi in 11 "i | I mi i in in 1111 in t ! * 1 1 I - mi i ii'i I I h r i t 
. *- v*.as the result of criminal conduct. 
Of course, the purpose * ne co:PUS delicti rule which 
^-. -- j i . i u i in In i II r f-iiM'it In 
of false confessions State v. Weldon, «. t P.2d 353, 354 (Utah 
1,957) defendant <=- confession clearly was not a false one. 
F i I s t, ~ ~ " > i" < J i i ,i c 3 i ( i i, I e s i 11 i I j > <: :» ] i c : e 
10
 In this context, the term "corpus delicti" involves the 
question of whether there was sufficient proof that a crime was 
committed to allow the introduction of defendant's confession at 
trial. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 n.8 (discussing distinction 
between corpus delicti for purposes of allowing introduction of a 
confession and corpus delicti as a t relates to evidence that 
defendant committed the crime). 
11
 i * o i a iiLJiiijii, ijiii l e i dUL'OLiiii. in i II ii'i I  mi I ' l i i g j di„ y , b e e i n f r a 
described how the thefts at various 7-11 stores had been 
executed, defendant confessed to criminal conduct that was 
strikingly similar to the Price burglary. Second, over $2,000 in 
quarters were found in defendant's possession. Finally, the 
burglary tools found in defendant's car -- bolt cutters, vice 
grips and screw drivers -- were the same type of tools used in 
the Price break in and were consistent with the burglary tools 
that defendant claimed he and his band of minions used to break 
into video machines. 
The independent evidence presented below not only 
established corpus delicti, it also dispelled any concern that 
defendant gave a false confession. Defendant's inculpatory 
statements were therefore properly admitted by the trial 
court.12 
12
 Defendant also challenges admission of evidence 
concerning the burglary in Price on the grounds that it ran afoul 
of Utah R. Evid. 401 & 404(b). Defendant's claim is without 
merit because the evidence was admitted solely for purposes of 
establishing corpus delicti (R. 139 at 53-4). It was clearly 
relevant to that issue because it tended to show that a crime had 
been committed, which is a prerequisite for admission of 
defendant's post-crime inculpatory statement under Utah's corpus 
delicti rule. See Point III of this brief. 
As for defendant's 404(b) challenge, that issue was not 
raised below, and defendant argues no basis for reaching the 
issue despite his failure to raise it below. His claim is 
therefore waived on appeal. State v. Smith, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Utah 1993) ("It is black-letter law that an appellate court will 
not address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in 
extraordinary circumstances[.]"). In any event, rule 404(b) has 
no bearing on this issue because testimony concerning the Price 
burglary was never presented as evidence of a prior bad act 
attributable to defendant. Rather, as stated above, it was 
admitted for the much narrower purpose of establishing corpus 
delicti to justify admission of defendant's post-crime admissions 
to police. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
uphold the trial cour* - denial of defendant's motion L.^  
suppress, and affn.. ,ierendantf~ conviction, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this QjL^ day of February, 
II 9:94. • 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZmGZpC 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SON T. NGUYEN, 
Defendant(s) 
s 
s 
1 
t 
• 
• 
Case No. 921400546 FS 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R. 
Burningham presiding on the 20th day of January, 1993. The 
Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney Cleve 
Hatch. The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, James R. Taylor. The matter was tried to the bench and 
the Court considered the Defendant's various Motions in Limine and 
to Suppress Evidence. The Court being fully advised in the 
premises does hereby make and enter the following: 
rrapjwss QF PACT 
1. On October 27, 1992, Maxine Barker, the owner/manager of 
a restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon observed a small car described 
as a Datsun or Toyota, cream or tan in color, occupied by five 
Asian individuals as it pulled up to her restaurant. One of the 
individuals came in and offered to sell her quarters. He indicated 
that he had two to three hundred rolls of quarters. Mrs. Barker 
purchased a couple of rolls which were wrapped in yellow notebook 
paper and obtained the license number of the Toyota car as it drove 
away. Shortly after the individuals left Mrs. Barker went to a 
telephone and called Utah County Dispatch and provided all of this 
information. 
2. Utah County Dispatchers in cooperation with patrol 
officers determined that shortly after the incident with Mrs. 
Barker additional attempts to sell quarters were made at two more 
businesses west of the first restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon. 
3. Dispatchers contacted Price and were told that Price 
Police were investigating a recent burglary and theft involving 
large numbers of quarters from a video arcade machine. 
4. Dispatchers ran a computer check on the license number 
provided and determined that the registered owner of the vehicle 
had a Vietnamese name and had a suspended driver's license. 
5. Dispatchers broadcast an "ATL" (attempt to locate) to 
patrol officers including the Utah County Sheriff and local police 
departments and contacted Highway Patrol dispatch. 
6. The information was dispatched to Highway Patrol officers 
and Department of Transportation vehicles. 
7. Shortly thereafter a small Toyota with the same license 
plate number occupied by four Asian individuals was observed 
northbound on Interstate 15. Highway Patrol troopers and other law 
enforcement agencies responded and the vehicle was stopped just 
west of American Fork on Interstate 15. 
8. A Utah Highway Patrol trooper approached the car and spoke 
with the driver who was the Defendant, Son t. Nguyen. The 
2 
*i 
Defendant denied having any quarters in the car or any knowledge of 
any incident in Price or Spanish Fork Canyon. 
9. The Defendant was not the registered owner of the car. 
Although he stated that the registered owner was a friend he was 
unable to give a full name, address, or phone number. 
10. Officers opened the trunk of the automobile and 
discovered a bag containing a large number of quarters, some 
wrapped in yellow notebook paper. Officers also found bolt cutters 
and tools in a separate bag in the trunk and additional rolls of 
quarters in the passenger compartment of the car. 
11. The Defendant was advised of his miranda rights, which he 
waived, and conversed with Deputy Dave Hill at the scene 
demonstrating an ability to speak and understand the English 
language. 
12. The quarters were taken into evidence and counted when it 
was determined that there was a total of $2,096.75 in quarters. 
13. The Defendant was taken to American Fork Police 
Department where he was again advised of his miranda rights and 
questioned by Detective Scott Carter of the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office after indicating that he was willing to waive his rights and 
speak without an attorney. 
14. The Defendant admitted to Detective Carter that he had 
been in Colorado with his friends and that they had burglarized 
several 7-11 stores. The Defendant stated that the quarters had 
been taken from video arcade games in the 7-11 stores. The 
Defendant stated that he thought there were approximately $550.00 
3 
worth of quarters. 
15. The Defendant was again interviewed several days later by 
Detective Carter. The Defendant executed a written waiver of his 
miranda rights and wrote and signed a confession which was accepted 
into evidence. 
16. The written statement of the Defendant was as follows: 
They borrow the car let drove it to Co. Spring 2 7eleven 
when we frist got in to C.S. then we rent a motel 2 
nights and after that we hit 4 more 7eleven then we drove 
to denver to eat and then drove home. We took quarters 
from the machine. I was with Monk, long, nam, nam. 
During the same interview the Defendant described to Detective 
Carter in detail how the burglaries would be performed. He stated 
that a group of individuals, all oriental, would go into the stores 
which were always 7-ll#s. They would play the video machines for 
a period of time until the clerk was no longer interested. They 
would then cut off the lock and completely remove the box for 
catching coins and simply walk out of the store with the stolen 
quarters and equipment. 
16. On October 10, 1992, a 7-11 in Price was burglarized. At 
approximately 2:00 a.m. seven oriental individuals entered the 
store and began playing video games which they did for 
approximately forty minutes. The individuals then left and the 
clerk didn't notice anything wrong with the video machine. At the 
beginning of the next shift it was noticed that the video machine 
was blank and not operating. The owner checked the machine and 
discovered that the lock to the coin box had been cut, the door to 
the coin collection box pried opened and the coin box removed. The 
4 
Price City Police were called to the 7-11/and an official report 
was taken and an investigation started* 
17. It was stipulated that the bolt cutters seized in the car 
the Defendant was driving was excluded as having cut the lock on 
the 7-11 in Price• 
18. The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on or 
about October 27# 1992, in Utah County the Defendant retained the 
property of another person knowing the property had been stolen or 
believing that it probably had been stolen with the purpose to 
deprive the owner of the property and the property was cash or 
coins with the value of more than $250.00 but less than $1,000.00. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and 
enters the following: 
CQNcmg?QNs of SAW 
1. The initial stop of the automobile being driven by the 
Defendant was lawful being based upon reasonable suspicion that the 
Defendant or the occupants of the car were involved in video 
burglaries in the Price area or that the occupants of the car 
contained evidence which may have been relevant to the Price 
investigation. 
2. The detention of the Defendant and the other passengers of 
the car did not exceed the scope of the initial stop. 
3. The warrantless search of the automobile was based upon 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. More specifically, a 
reasonable person in viewing the evidence available to the officers 
could have concluded that it was likely that the automobile 
5 
contained evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of coins in the 
Price area. Inasmuch as the potential evidence was in an 
automobile traveling away from the suspected crime and the best 
information available indicated that the occupants were in the 
midst of actively disposing of potential evidence, there were 
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search* 
4. Although the evidence independent of the Defendant's 
confession by itself does not establish the corpus delicti of the 
crime charged when considered together with the confession the 
Court believes that there is substantial separate evidence of the 
corpus delicti such that reasonable minds could believe that the 
crime was a real one which was in fact committed and not one which 
was fanciful or imaginary. 
5. The Defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily made 
following an appropriate waiver of his rights to counsel as 
required by Miranda. 
6. The Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree felony. 
/£ day of ffauudiyyi993 * 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
C 
I****** 
GtfiHR. SURNINGHAM 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CLEVE HATCH 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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